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An Efficient Key Management Scheme for Secure Data Access Control
in Wireless Broadcast Services
K.V.Rajesh & P.Harini,
Dept. of CSE, St.ann’s College of Engg. & Tech., Chirala
E-mail: venkatarajeshkaki@gmail.com, hpogadanda@yahoo.co.in

Abstract - Wireless broadcast is an effective approach to disseminate data to a number of users. To provide secure access
to data in wireless broadcast services, symmetric key - based encryption is used to ensure that only users who own the
valid keys can decrypt the data. Regarding various subscriptions, an efficient key management to distribute and change keys is
in great demand for access control in broadcast services. In this paper, we propose an efficient key management scheme (namely
KTR) to key distribution with regarding to complex subscription options and user activities. KTR has the following
advantages. First, it supports all subscription activities in wireless broadcast services. Second, in KTR, a user only needs to hold
one set of keys for all subscribed programs, instead of separate sets of keys for each program. Third, KTR identifies the minimum set
of keys that must be changed to ensure broadcast security and minimize the rekey cost. Our simulations show that KTR can save
about 45% of communication overhead in the broadcast channel and about 50% of decryption cost for each user, compared with
logical key hierarchy based approaches.
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Data is broadcast periodically so that users can recover
lost or missed data items. The uplink channels, which
have limited bandwidth, are reserved for occasional
uses to dynamically change subscriptions.

INTRODUCTION

With the ever growing popularity of smart mobile
devices along with the rapid advent of wireless
technology, there has been an increasing interest in
wireless data services among both industrial and
academic communities in recent years. Among
various approaches, broadcast allows a very efficient
usage of the scarce wireless bandwidth, because it
allows simultaneous access by an arbitrary number of
mobile clients [1]. Wireless data broadcast services
have been available as commercial products for many
years. In particular, the announcement of the MSN
Direct Service (direct.msn.com) has further highlighted
the industrial interest in and feasibility of utilizing
broadcast for wireless data services.

In broadcast services, the basic data unit is data
item, such as a piece of news or a stock price. Data
items are grouped into programs and a user specifies
which programs he would like to access. Typical
programs could be weather, news, stock quotes, etc. For
simplicity, we assume that each program covers a
set of data items, and programs are exclusively
complete. A user may subscribe to one or more programs.
The set of subscribed programs is called the user’s
subscription. Users can subscribe via Internet or uplink
channels to specify the programs that they are interested
in receiving.

A wireless data broadcast system consists of three
components as depicted in Figure 1: (1) the broadcast
server; (2) the mobile devices; and (3) the
communication mechanism. The server broadcasts data
on air. A user’s mobile device receives the broadcast
information, and filters the subscribed data according to
user’s queries and privileges. The specialty of the
broadcast system is that (a) the server determines the
schedule to broadcast all data on air, and (b) users’
mobile devices listen to the broadcast channel but only
retrieve data (filter data out) based on users’ queries. The
communication mechanism includes wireless broadcast
channels and (optional) uplink channels. Broadcast
channel is the main mechanism for data dissemination.

Previous studies on wireless data broadcast services
have mainly focused on performance issues such as
reducing data access latency and conserving battery
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power of mobile devices. Unfortunately, the critical
security requirements of this type of broadcast service
have not yet been addressed, i.e. broadcast service
providers need to ensure backward and forward secrecy
[2], [3] with respect to membership dynamics. In the
wireless broadcast environment, any user can monitor
the broadcast channel and record the broadcast data.
If the data is not encrypted, the content is open to the
public and anyone can access the data. In addition, a
user may only subscribe to a few programs. If data in
other programs are not encrypted, the user can obtain
data beyond his subscription privilege. Hence, access
control should be enforced via encrypting data in a
proper way so that only subscribing users can access the
broadcast data, and subscribing users can only access the
data to which they subscribe.

Two categories of key management schemes in the
literature may be applied in broadcast services: (1) logic
key hierarchy (LKH) based techniques [2]-[9]
proposed for multicast ser-vices ; and (2) broadcast
encryption techniques [10]-[16] in current broadcast
services (such as satellite TV). We notice that current
broadcast encryption techniques, including BISS
[17], Digicipher [18], Irdeto [19], Nagravision [20],
Viaccess [21], and VideoGuard [22], cannot in fact
support flexibility. They normally require users to
possess decryption boxes to receive the subscribed
programs, and the broadcast services can only
provide to users a few packages, each of which
includes a fixed set of programs (TV channels). Users
cannot select individual programs within a package. If
a user wants to change his subscription, the user needs
to request another decryption box that can decrypt
the subscribed programs.

Symmetric-key-based encryption is a natural choice
for ensuring secure data dissemination and access. The
broadcast data can be encrypted so that only those
users who own valid keys can decrypt them. Thus,
the decryption keys can be used as an effective means
for access control in wireless data broadcast services.
For example, each program has one unique key to
encrypt the data items. The key is issued to the user
who is authorized to receive and decrypt the data
items. If a user subscribes to multiple programs, it
needs an encryption key for each program. Since a user
only has keys for his subscription, he cannot decrypt
broadcast data and rekey messages designated to other
users. At the same time, a data item can be decrypted
by an arbitrary number of users who subscribe to it.
This allows many users to receive the data at the
same time and addresses the scalability problem, or
request lost or missed keys.

Hence, in this paper, we will focus on adapting
more flexible LKH-based techniques. Nevertheless,
directly applying LKH in broadcast services is not the
most efficient approach. In broadcast services, a
program is equivalent to a multicast group, and users
who subscribe to one program form a group.
Intuitively, we could manage a separate set of keys for
each program, and ask a user to hold m sets of keys for
his subscribed m programs. This straightforward
approach is inefficient for users subscribing to many
programs. If users could use the same set of keys for
multiple programs, there would be fewer
requirements for users to handle keys. Furthermore,
when a user changes subscription, we argue that it is
unnecessary to change keys for the programs to which
the user is still subscribing, as long as security can be
ensured. In this way, rekey cost can be reduced and
fewer users will be affected. Therefore, we propose a
new key management scheme, namely key tree reuse
(KTR), based on two important observations: (1) users
who subscribe to multiple programs can be captured
by a shared key tree, and (2) old keys can be reused
to save rekey cost without compromising security.
KTR has two components: shared key tree and shared
key management, and its contribution includes the
following aspects.

Nevertheless, when a user subscribes/ unsubscribes
to a program, the encryption key needs to be changed
to ensure that the user can only access the data in
his subscription period. Consequently, a critical issue
remains, i.e. how can we efficiently manage keys when
a user joins/leaves/changes the service without
compromising security and interrupting the operations
of other users? Regarding unique features of broadcast
services, we are interested in new key management
schemes that can simultaneously provide security,
efficiency and flexibility. A broadcast service
generally provides many programs; at the same time,
users may like to subscribe to an arbitrary set of
programs. We envision that a user should be able to
flexibly subscribe/ unsubscribe to any program of
interests and make changes to his subscription at
any time. Hence, in addition to security and efficiency,
flexibility that a user can customize his subscription
at anytime is an indispensable feature of key
management in broadcast services to support user
subscriptions.

Contributions. First, the proposed scheme takes
advantage of a fact in broadcast services: many
users subscribe to multiple programs simultaneously.
In other words, programs overlap with each other in
terms of users. Because existing approaches manage
keys by separating programs, they turn to
be demanding for the users who subscribe to many
programs. Hence, this study contributes to the
literature a new scheme (namely KTR) to better
support subscriptions of multiple programs by
exploiting the overlapping among programs. KTR
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let multiple programs share the same set of keys for the
users who subscribe to these programs. KTR thus
inherently enables users to handle fewer keys and
reduces the demands of storage and processing power on
resource-limited mobile devices.
Second, since multiple programs are allowed to
share the same set of keys, a critical issue is how to
manage shared keys efficiently and securely. We find
that when keys need to be distributed to a user, it is
unnecessary
to
change
all
of
them.
In
many circumstances, when a user subscribes to new
programs or unsubscribes to some programs, a large
portion of keys that the user will hold in his new
subscription can be reused without compromising
security. KTR is a novel approach for
determining which keys need to be changed and for
finding the minimum number of keys that must be
changed. Hence, KTR efficiently handles the rekey of
the shared keys and minimizes the rekey costs
associated with possible subscriptions. Our
simulations show that critical keys can be employed in
logical key hierarchy schemes [2], [5] to improve their
performance.

Fig. 2. Logical key hierarchy
When a user joins or leaves the group, the server needs
to change and broadcast the corresponding new keys,
and this operation is called rekey, and the broadcast
message of new keys is called rekey message. In our
system, data and rekey messages are broadcast in the
same broadcast channel to the users. Assume user u1
leaves the group (in Figure 2). The server needs to
change k4, k2 and k1 so that u1 will no longer decrypt
any data for this group, which is encrypted by k1.
The rekey message is
{k4}ku , {k2}ku , {k1}ku , {k4}k4, {k2}k2, {k1}k1

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we present related works on group key
management. In Section III, the first component of
KTR is described that fully utilizes the service
structure to reduce the number of keys.
In Section IV, the second component of KTR
ispresented to reduce rekey cost when updating and
distributing shared keys. In Section V, we present the
results of simulations to illustrate the performance
improvements in KTR. Finally, we conclude
in Section VI.

1

1

1

The first three components are for u1 to use his
individual key to decrypt the new keys, and the last
three are for all existing users to use their old keys to
decrypt the new keys. In this way, u1 will not obtain
any old key.
LKH is an efficient and secure key management for
multi-cast services in that each user only needs to hold
O(log2(n)) keys for the user’s group, and the size of a
rekey message is also O(log2(n)), where n is the
number of group users. It is also a flexible key
management approach that allows a user to join and
leave the multicast group at any time. Many variations
of LKH have been proposed. Because LKH simply uses
independent keys, researchers developed several other
approaches [23], [24] that generate new keys by
exploiting the relation between child and parent
keys or the relation between old and new keys. Our
scheme is complementary to these schemes, since our
scheme mainly examines whether keys need be
changed in stead of how keys are generated.
[6] proposes a combination of key tree and DiffieHellman key exchange to provide a simple and
fault-tolerant key agreement for collaborative groups.
[23] reduces the number of rekey messages, while [9],
[25] improve the reliability of rekey management.
Balanced and unbalanced key trees are discussed in
[5] and [26]. Periodic group re-keying is studied
in [7], [8] to reduce the rekey cost for groups with
frequent joins and leaves. Issues on how to maintain a

II. RELATED WORKS ON KEY
MANAGEMENT
A. Logical Key Hierarchy
Secure key management for wireless broadcast is
closely related to secure group key management in
networking [4]. Logical key hierarchy (LKH) is
proposed in [2], [5] that uses a key tree (depicted in
Figure 2) for each group of users who subscribe the
same program. The root (top node) of the tree is the
data encryption key (DEK) of the program. Each leaf
(bottom node) in the tree represents an individual key
(IDK) of a user that is only shared between the system
and the user. Other keys in the tree, namely key
distribution keys (KDKs), are used to encrypt new
DEKs and KDKs. A user only knows the keys along the
path from the leaf of the user to the root of the key
tree.
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key tree and how to efficiently place encrypted keys in
multicast rekey packets are studied in [8], [26].
Moreover, the performance of LKH is thoroughly
studied [3], [8].
B. Broadcast Encryption
There are some other key management schemes
in the literature for multicast and broadcast services.
[10] used arbitrarily revealed key sequences to do
scalable multicast key management without any
overhead on joins/leaves. [11] proposed two schemes
that insert an index head into packets for decryption.
However, both of them require pre-planned
subscription, which contradicts the fact that in pervasive
com-puting and air data access a user may change
subscriptions at any moment. In addition, [11] only
supports a limited combination of programs. [13]
proposed a scheme to yield maximal resilience against
arbitrary coalitions of non-privileged users. However,
the size (entropy) of its broadcast key message is
large, at least O(n) [12]. Zero-message scheme [14], [15]
does not require the broadcast server to disseminate any
message in order to generate a common key. But it is
only resilient against coalitions of k non-privileged
users, and requires every user to store
O(klog2(k)log2(n)) keys. Naor et al. [16] proposed a
stateless scheme to facilitate group members to obtain
up-to-date session keys even if they miss some
previous key distribution messages. Although this
scheme is more efficient than LKH in rekey
operations, it mainly handles revocation when a user
stops subscription. It does not efficiently support joins,
which are crucial in our system. Finally, [24], [27]
proposed self-healing approaches for group members
to recover the session keys by combining information
from previous key distribution information.

Fig. 3. Shared key tree
A. Key Forest
To address scalability and flexibility in key
management, LKH is used as the basis of our scheme.
An intuitive solution is to use a key tree for each
program as shown in Figure 3(a). However, when
user
u1
subscribes
to
two
programs
simultaneously, he needs to manage two sets of keys in
both trees which is not very efficient (see Figure
3(a)). Hence, shared key tree (SKT) is proposed to
reduce this cost in key management. As shown in
Figure 3(b), we let the two programs share the same
sub key tree as represented by the gray triangle. We
regroup users so that users subscribing to both
programs only need to manage keys in the gray triangle.
The advantage of shared key tree is clear: any user
subscribing to both g1 and g2 only needs to manage one set
of keys for both programs. Moreover, when a user joins
or leaves a tree shared by multiple programs, the
encryption and communication cost for rekey operations
can be significantly less than conventional
LKH approaches.
In order to ensure that a user will not pay for
subscribed programs multiple times, the key forest
obviously should have the following properties, which
are guaranteed in any directed and acyclic graph.

Compared with LKH-based approaches, key
management schemes in broadcast encryption are less
flexible regarding possible subscriptions. Conforming
to the current practice described in RFC2627 [2], we
select binary trees to present our scheme. Note that our
scheme does not require binary trees and can be applied
in trees of other degrees.

Property 3.1: Only one path exists by following the
upward links from the root of a tree trs to the DEKs of
the programs that share trs;
Property 3.2: Only one path exists by following the
upward links from any leaf node in a tree to the root;
Property 3.3: Each user belongs only to one tree in the
key forest, and his individual key is the leaf node of
the tree.

III. SHARED KEY STRUCTURE
Directly applying LKH is not efficient in broadcast
services. We use a shared key structure to address the
key management. In the following, we describe how a
shared key structure is applied and then raise the
security and efficiency problems of this scheme. We
then present a novel shared key management
in Section IV that ensures security and minimizes
rekey cost, and also address major issues when
applying KTR in a broadcast server.

B. Root Graph
The root graph in Figure 4 depicts how
programs share
keys. Since m programs could
generate 2m − 1 different subscriptions, such a twolayer structure in fact brings two major problems in
terms of rekey overheads when the number of programs
is large.

International Journal of Smart Sensors and Ad Hoc Networks (IJSSAN) ISSN No. 2248‐9738 Volume‐2, Issue‐1

4

An Efficient Key Management Scheme for Secure Data Access Control in Wireless Broadcast Services

there could be 230 = 1 billion different subscriptions,
which is much larger than the number
of users. Hence, managing keys for all possible
subscriptions would overload the server. Now,
assume the service has n users and 2m ≫ n. Although
2m−1 different subscriptions exist, at most n
subscriptions are valid, since the number of valid
subscriptions cannot be more than the number of users.
Hence, this problem can be easily solved by letting the
server only manage the valid subscriptions that have at
least one user.

First, a program may be included in many
subscriptions, which means the DEK of the program is
connected with many trees. Assume the DEK is
connected with n trees. When a user stops subscribing
the program, the DEK needs to be updated
and distributed to users in n trees. Because the new
DEK is encrypted with the roots of the n trees in
rekey, O(n) rekey items are generated. Obviously, if
n is large, a leave event

C. Rekey Operations
In this study, we consider user activities
of Joining/leaving/shiftingamong trees, instead of
joining/quitting/changing among programs. Table I
lists the mapping between tree-oriented operations
and the corresponding program-oriented user events.
Consider the example in Figure 4, where a user us
shifts from tr4 to tr6. When us was in tr4, us subscribed
g1 and g2. After he shifts to tr6, he subscribes g1, g2
and g3. Hence, the shift in fact means the user adds
g3 into his current subscription. Note that the
discussion of rekey operations in this study only
considers individual user events.

Fig. 4. Key forest

To issue new keys upon a user event, the main
task is to identify the keys that need to be changed. We
use two types of paths in the key forest to represent the
to-be-changed keys. When a user leaves a tree, we
say, a leave path is formed, which consists of keys that
the
user
will
no
longer
use.
When
a user joins a tree, we say, an enroll path is formed,
which consists of keys that the user will use in the
future. Similarly, when a user shifts from one tree to
another, a leave path and an enroll path are formed. In
KTR,
a
complete
path
starts
from
the leaf node and ends at the multiple DEKs of the
subscribed programs that share the tree. For example, in
Figure 4, when us shifts from tr4 to tr6, the leave path
consists of kn L and kr, and the enroll path consists of
knj kr6 , kg1 , kg2 and kg3.

Fig. 5. Multi-layer root graph
results in a huge rekey message. For example, in Figure
5(a), 3 programs are included in 5 different
subscriptions. Program g1’s DEK kg1 is connected with
4 roots kr1, kr2, kr3.
Hence, when kg1 is updated due to a leave event, 4
rekey items are needed.
To solve this problem, we use a multi-layer
structure to connect the DEK with the roots of the
shared trees.

To broadcast new keys, the server should first
compose rekey packets. In this study, we take the
standard LKH approach to encrypt a new key ki in
a rekey item {ki}kj. If ki is in an enroll path, kj is
the old ki, i.e. {ki}k ≡ {ki}k

Second, a subscription is not a conventional
plan that a broadcast service provides, because the
subscribed programs of a plan normally cannot be
changed by a user. In this paper, users are able to
customize the selection of programs in their
subscriptions. Thereby, a broadcast service could easily
have a large number of different subscriptions. For
example, even if a service provides only 30 programs
that is a small number in many broadcast services,

If ki is in a leave path, kj is a child key of ki.
Readers can refer to [2], [5] for examples of rekey
packets.
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TABLE I
REKEY OPERATIONS

Algorithm 1 Update of refresh and renew spots
Assume ki is used in the rekey messages upon a user
event.

Tree

Program oriented events.

Join a
tree

Assume a user has not subscribed to any
program. He subscribes to one or multiple
programs.

1: if ki is in a leave path then

Leave
a tree

Assume a user has subscribed to several
programs. He Unsubscribes to all current
programs.

4: if ki is critical in an enroll path then

Shift
among
trees

Assume a user has subscribed several
programs.
He subscribes to one or a few more
programs.
He unsubscribes to a part of the current
programs
He changes a part of the current programs.

7: if ki’s parent key kj is in a leave path then

2:renew spots must be added to all ki’s spot series;
3: end if
5:renew spots must be added to all ki’s spot series;
6: end if
8:refresh spots must be added to ki’s spot series that are
associated with the programs sharing kj ;
9: end if
Definition 4.1: Renew spot of a key ki: the time
point t when ki’s value is changed. ki’s new value
starting from t is denoted as ki(t).
Definition 4.2: Refresh spot of a key ki: the time
point t when ki is used to encrypt its parent key kj ’s
new value in a refreshment δ(kj , t; ki, t).

KTR to efficiently address the security issue in
reusing keys. Since rekey cost is determined by the
number of must-be-changed keys, the cost can be
minimized if we can find the minimum number of
must-be-changed keys when the user joins or shifts to
the tree. We name the must-be-changed keys in an
enroll path as critical keys. KTR changes all keys in a
leave path and only the critical keys in an enroll path,
while leaving all the other keys unchanged. In this
way, the rekey cost can be minimized.

Definition 4.3: Refreshment, δ(kj , t; ki, t′): a rekey
message broadcast at t in the form of {kj(t)}ki(t’)
t’≤t.
Algorithm3 Algorithm of KTR in Broadcast Server
1:
2:
3:

IV. SHARED KEY MANAGEMENT

4:

In this section, we first present some important
concepts in Section IV-A and IV-B, which are used for
identifying critical keys . Then, we present the
condition under which a key is critical in Section IV-C
and IV-D and the corresponding key management
algorithms

5:
6:
7:
8:
9:

A:Rekey Spots
KTR basically logs how a key was used in rekey
messages. We can always find two operations in any
rekey message:

if a join or shift event happens then
according to TCK, find all critical keys in the tree
the user wants to join or shift to;
select the best enroll path that has the
minimum number of critical keys;
change all critical keys in the best enroll path,
and broadcast corresponding rekey messages;
end if
if a leave or shift event happens then
change all keys in the leave path, and
broadcast corresponding rekey messages;
end if
update renew, refresh and revive spots according
to the latest rekey messages;

Theorem 4.1 indicates that changing only critical keys
can ensure past confidentiality. Hence, given a key
forest, Algorithm 3 is applied to find the best enroll path
and minimize the rekey cost. When a join or shift
event happens to a tree, the algorithm uses the depthfirst tree traversal approach to find all critical keys in the
tree. If a path is found to have fewer critical keys than
previously visited paths, the algorithm records it as the
best enroll path.

1) a key’s value is changed or 2) a key is used to
encrypt its parent key when the parent key’s value is
changed. Accordingly, we define two types of spots to
log the time points when either operation is
committed.
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Corollary 4.1: When a user joins a tree, a key in the
enroll path is a critical key if and only if one of the
key’s ages is greater than 0.

When multiple users collude, they may try to share
their keys to derived unknown group keys. the sharing
can be represented by a sub graph of the paths
belonging to the colluding users. However, in KTR,
user does not know any key not in this path. Hence
colluding users do not know any key outside the sub
graph that represents the collusion. KTR thus satisfies
property 4.2

Before a user joins the tree, his subscription ages
for all of the programs sharing this tree are 0. Hence, if
the age of a key in the enroll path for this program is
greater than 0, the key is older than the user’s
subscription. According to Theorem 4.1, the key needs
to bechanged before being distributed to the user.

Property 4.3: Future confidentiality (forward secrecy):
a Leaving user not have access to any group key after
leaving his present group.
According to Algorithm 3, KTR changes all keys in
the leave path, because the leaving user holds these
keys. Hence, the leaving user will not have the new
keys after the user leaves his group. KTR thus satisfies
Property 4.3.

Corollary 4.2: After a user enrolls in a tree, all keys in
the enroll path are not older than the user.
According to Theorem 4.1, if a key is older than the
user’s subscription regarding a program, the key needs to
be changed. Hence, at the time when the user enrolls in
a tree, the keys, whose ages are older than the user,
are renewed and their ages turns to be 0. If the key
is not older than the user’s subscription regarding
any program, the key does not need to be changed.
Hence, the key continues to be not older than the user.
Therefore, after a user enrolls in a tree, all keys in the
enroll path are not older than the user.

Property 4.4: Past confidentiality (backward secrecy):
a Joining user added at time t should not have access
to any keys used to encrypt data before t.According to
Algorithm 3, KTR changes all critical keys in the
enroll path when a user joins. Theorem 4.1 basically
proves that the joining user can only derive past group
keys from critical keys. Hence, changing critical keys
and reusing non-critical keys prevent the joining user
from obtaining past group keys. KTR thus satisfies
Property 4.4.

Corollary 4.3: When a user shifts from a tree to
another tree, the keys overlap both trees do not need to
be changed.
Assume the user shifts from tree trα to tree trβ .
According to Corollary 4.2, after the user enrolls in

V. CONCLUSION

trα, all keys in the enroll path cannot not be older than

In this work, we investigated the issues of key
management in support of secure wireless broadcast
services. We proposed KTR as a scalable, efficient
and secure key management approach in the
broadcast system. We used the key forest to exploit
the overlapping nature between users and programs in
broadcast services. KTR let multiple programs
share a single tree so that the users subscribing these
programs can hold fewer keys. In addition, we
proposed an ovel shared key management approach
to further reduce rekey cost by identifying the
minimum set of keys that must be changed to ensure
broadcast security. This approach is also applicable to
other LKH-based approaches to reduce the rekey cost
as in KTR. Our simulation showed that KTR can
save about 45% of communication overhead in the
broadcast channel and about 50% of decryption cost for
each user, compared with the traditional LKH approach.

the user. Hence, when the user shifts to trβ , the
overlapped keys, which were in the enroll path when
user enrolled in trα, do not need to be changed
according to Theorem 4.1.
E. Security Analysis
To ensure multicast or broadcast security, group key
management should satisfy four security properties [2],
[3]: non-group confidentiality, collusion freedom, future
confidentiality (forward secrecy), and past confidentiality
(backward secrecy). In the following, we discuss how
KTR satisfies these properties.
Property 4.1: Non-group confidentiality: passive
adversaries should not have access to any group key.
Because keys are encrypted when being broadcast,
passive adversaries can not decrypt any key without
knowing decryption key. Hence, KTR obviously
satisfies Property 4.1.
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